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The Korea–United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) 
is a historic accord that should enhance bilateral economic rela-
tions and reinforce our longstanding partnership on political and 
security matters. Like any negotiated deal, the KORUS FTA is 
not the optimal result for either country, but it provides substan-
tial benefits that make Korea and the United States considerably 
better off than they would be in the absence of the pact.
The FTA should reinforce the already substantial commer-
cial ties between the United States and Korea. The US-Korea pact 
covers more trade than any other US trade agreement except the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In 2006 bilat-
eral merchandise trade exceeded $75 billion, with US exports of 
$30.8 billion and imports from Korea of $44.7 billion. Over the 
past five years, however, the growth in US-Korea trade has been 
sluggish; total two-way trade has grown at an average annual rate 
of only less than 7 percent. Indeed, for the past few years, Korean 
exports to the United States have been flat while US exports to 
Korea have grown only modestly (see table 1).1 
1. US-Korea trade growth has been overshadowed by each country’s soaring trade 
with China, which has become Korea’s leading trading partner.
In economic terms, the FTA is important because it opens 
up substantial new opportunities for bilateral trade and invest-
ment in goods and services. At the same time, it is controversial 
because the reforms required by the KORUS FTA will increase 
competition for Korean and American firms, workers, and farm-
ers and thus will require adjustment. Both countries will benefit: 
Even though economic models yield sometimes widely differing 
results, the published forecasts of the welfare gains from the FTA 
all are positive (see Kiyota and Stern 2007). As a practical matter, 
however, the size of the gains for each country will depend impor-
tantly on how government policies and firm strategies respond to 
the new competitive environment.
Like other FTAs, the KORUS FTA also serves important 
foreign policy interests. In particular, it is part of each country’s 
strategic response both to the challenges to security and stability 
on the Korean peninsula and to evolving economic integration 
arrangements in East Asia. For the United States, it is critically 
important to have a strong economic and political alliance with 
South Korea. The ongoing challenges posed by the North Korean 
regime should make that point self-evident.
For the same reason, it is important for the United States to 
participate in and help shape the course of economic integration 
in East Asia. The region is the hotbed of regional trading arrange-
ments, with a variety of pacts differing in scope and coverage 
linking the economies of the Association of South East Asian 
Nations  (ASEAN)  with  large  industrial  producers  in  China, 
Japan, and Korea. These initiatives are driven by the growing role 
of China in the regional and world economy. Not surprisingly, 
they reflect Chinese political as well as economic interests in its 
neighborhood, and Korean and Japanese attempts to emulate and 
compete with their new number one trading partner.2 The United 
States is engaged to a limited extent in this process of integration 
through its FTA with Singapore and its network of consultative 
accords with the ASEAN. For the United States, the KORUS 
FTA is a way to buttress recent sluggish trade, counter discrimi-
nation against US exporters resulting from other pacts to which 
the United States is not a party, and signal continuing US engage-
ment in a region critical for US economic and political security.
2. China surpassed the United States as Korea’s top trading partner in 2004 and 
became Japan’s leading partner in the first half of 2007.
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One of the principal dangers currently facing the world economy 
arises from the large and unsustainable imbalances in current 
account  positions.  Some  observers  argue  that  these  imbal-
ances will unwind gradually and nondisruptively, while others 
emphasize the risks of a sudden change of sentiment in financial 
markets that could result in an abrupt and damaging adjustment. 
No one knows which scenario will materialize, but a priority 
for policymakers should be to reduce the risks of a crisis, which 
could produce a world recession and disruptions to the global 
trading system. For that, the global economy requires official 
sponsorship of a credible, comprehensive adjustment program. 
This policy brief outlines such a program.
Section 1 presents why the current situation is unsustain-
able. Adjustment must take place and will require significant 
movements in exchange rates. Section 2 argues that adjustment 
induced by policy actions is more likely to be orderly than one 
initiated by financial markets. We view the current stalemate 
regarding policy actions as dangerous, as financial-market partic-
ipants are likely to change their minds at some stage about the 
sustainability of imbalances unless they see that the main players 
are able to agree on the direction of desirable policy changes. 
Section 3 presents estimates of the exchange rate implications 
of global current account adjustment from a variety of models. 
Section 4 describes the policy implications the authors of this 
brief drew from these results and the workshop discussions.
WHY THE CURRENT SITUATION 
IS UNSUSTAINABLE
There has been a great deal of discussion recently of global current 
account imbalances. Much of the attention has focused on the 
historically large US current account deficit, which, according to 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, reached $857 billion (6.5 
percent of GDP) in 2006. The counterpart to this deficit can be 
found mainly in Asia and the oil-exporting countries. Accord-
ing to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s surplus 
swelled to an estimated $184 billion (7.2 percent of GDP) in 
2006,1 while Japan recorded an estimated surplus of $167 billion 
(3.7 percent of GDP) last year. High oil prices propelled the 
surplus for countries in the Middle East to $282 billion last 
year. 
1. This estimate appears conservative. China’s trade surplus in goods was $178 
billion in 2006, with imports reported on a cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f) basis. 
When the import data are adjusted to free on board (f.o.b.), the trade in goods 
surplus will likely come in at about $215 billion. Based on trends in the other 
items in the first-half balance of payments, Nicholas Lardy estimates that China’s 
surplus last year was $240 billion (see Nicholas Lardy,  Toward a Consumption-
Driven Growth Path, Policy Briefs in International Economics PB06-6, Washing-
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In this policy brief, I assess what the agreement achieved 
and its implications for evolving trade relations in the Asia-
Pacific region. I conclude with a brief comment on the impend-
ing ratification debate in the US Congress.
Assessing the KORUs FtA: Key POints
The outcome of the KORUS FTA negotiations was predictable 
and as predicted (see Schott, Bradford, and Moll 2006). The 
agreement is comprehensive in scope, with calibrated excep-
tions made in a respectful bow to political reality. Each side was 
sensitive to the priority concerns of the other. Compromises 
were reached on several important political issues, including 
autos, rice, and treatment of production from the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex in North Korea.
Highlights of the deal have been summarized in the “fact 
sheets” posted by both governments. Most tariffs on bilateral 
trade will be removed within three years, which is significant 
even though average tariffs are relatively low, because bilateral 
trade is so large. Even in agriculture, where Korean trade barri-
ers are much higher, many tariffs will be phased out over time 
and many quotas will be expanded; only rice will be exempted 
from some degree of liberalization. The impact of these bilateral 
preferences will depend, of course, on (1) what happens in the 
Doha Round and how quickly such multilateral liberalization 
is implemented (since liberalization on a most favored nation 
basis would dilute the relative value of the FTA tariff prefer-
ences), and (2) the evolution of other FTAs among Asia-Pacific 
countries.
The following subsections provide a broad brush analysis 
of key aspects of the FTA. I focus my comments on autos, agri-
culture, services, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex, since 
these areas are receiving the most scrutiny in the public debate 
in both countries.
Automotive trade
Any assessment of the impact of the FTA on manufactures 
must start with autos. The automotive industry is an important 
producer and employer in both Korea and the United States. 
Korean production has grown steadily since 2001, from 2.95 
million vehicles to 3.7 million in 2005 (of which about 70 
percent were exported).3 Over the same period, US produc-
tion has hovered around 12 million vehicles (despite increased 
volumes by foreign companies producing in the United States) 
but has weakened somewhat since the second half of 2006. In 
contrast, US auto sales have remained relatively firm: During 
January–July 2007, total US auto sales were running at an 
annual rate of 16.3 million (down 3.2 percent from the same 
period  in  2006).4  Demand  in  the  Korean  market  is  down 
sharply from earlier this decade.5
In 2006 Korea exported about 700,000 cars to the United 
States; US car exports to Korea totaled about 4,500. In addition, 
auto companies have substantial investments in each other’s 
market. Hyundai produced almost 300,000 cars in its new US 
plant (and Kia is building a US facility with similar capacity); 
the General Motors joint venture in Korea (GM Daewoo Auto 
and Technology) had domestic sales and exports of more than 
1.1 million cars and accounted for about 12 percent of Korean 
car sales.6
The  auto  sector  accounts  for  about  9  percent  of  total 
manufacturing employment in each country and auto unions 
in both countries have criticized the FTA. In 2004, Korean 
auto companies employed almost 250,000 workers. Korean 
union officials voice concerns that cost pressures are leading 
Korean automakers to produce abroad, including in the US 
market—though  their  criticism  has  been  relatively  muted 
because of Korea’s booming exports.
Auto  production  in  the  United  States  employed  1.1 
3. In 2005 Korean auto exports (defined broadly as Harmonized Schedule 
[HS] 87) were valued at $37.5 billion; sales to the US market accounted for 
28 percent of Korean exports, the European Union–15 took 22 percent, and 
China took 9 percent.
4. According to Ward’s AutoInfoBank, the US “Big 3” sales were down almost 
9 percent in 2007 compared with that in 2006, while sales of Asian and 
European cars recorded modest increases.
5.  Sales in the Korean market averaged 1.1 million vehicles annually in 
2004–06, down more than 20 percent from the previous three-year average 
sales.
6. In 2002 General Motors bought a controlling share of Daewoo Motor and 
established GM Daewoo Auto and Technology in collaboration with Suzuki, 
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation, and Daewoo creditors.
 Table 1    US-Korea merchandise trade, 2001–06
                    (millions of dollars)







001 0,899 34,917 –14,018
00 1,151 35,84 –14,133
003 ,55 36,99 –14,404
004 4,995 45,064 –0,069
005 6,10 43,155 –16,945
006 30,794 44,714 –13,90
      Note: Data report domestic exports and imports for consumption. 
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million workers (250,210 in assembly; 175,600 in auto bodies; 
and 667,720 in parts) out of total 2006 US manufacturing 
employment  of  14.2  million.  However,  in  the  auto  sector, 
as in manufacturing more broadly, US employment is down 
from levels a decade earlier. Total US manufacturing jobs in 
2006 were down about 18 percent and those in the US auto 
sector were down about 17 percent since 2000. New US plants 
recently built by Hyundai and Kia, which project combined 
production of about 600,000 cars by the end of this decade, will 
provide some modest relief. The US employment data, coupled 
with stagnant real wages for the past decade, explain to some 
extent why US autoworkers have become increasingly restive 
toward new free trade initiatives in general and the KORUS 
FTA  in  particular.  In  that  regard,  however,  Hufbauer  and 
Schott (2005) found that the wage premium paid to unionized 
auto workers—the amount they earn in excess of the average 
for manufacturing workers—was compressed largely as a result 
of US nonunion auto plants. Many of those plants are foreign 
“transplants.”
The auto sector accounts for a large segment of bilateral 
trade and a large share of the US trade deficit with Korea. That 
deficit, along with a checkered history of attempts to remove 
Korean trade barriers pursuant to bilateral understandings on 
autos, has led auto unions and two car companies, Chrysler 
and Ford, to oppose the KORUS FTA.
Two-way  trade  is  substantial;  in  2006,  Korea-US  auto 
trade totaled $11.6 billion or about 15 percent of bilateral 
merchandise trade. Korean car exports to the United States 
were valued at about $10.9 billion; by contrast, US exports to 
Korea totaled only $730 million, mostly auto parts such as gear 
boxes and air bags.7 Autos accounted for 24 percent of total US 
imports from Korea in 2006.
The disparity in bilateral trade flows in this sector has 
provoked heated concerns that continue to echo in the congres-
sional debate on the KORUS FTA—including a demand issued 
in March 2007 that the pact include quantitative indicators 
to ensure increased US exports to Korea (see Inside US Trade, 
March 9, 2007, 16). To some US observers, the disparity in the 
volume of Korean exports to the US market compared with 
US exports to Korea (about 150 to 1) is prima facie evidence of 
discrimination.8 They remain skeptical that the KORUS FTA 
will provide meaningful market access for US exporters, given 
the limited results from attempts over the past two decades 
to break down barriers to the Korean auto market, including 
through two US-Korea memoranda of understanding on autos 
in the 1990s. They conclude that US sales will not increase 
7. Data cover HS chapter 87 as reported in the USITC Dataweb.
8. However, the vigorous growth in Korean auto exports also suggests that 
Korean products are becoming increasingly competitive in world markets.
significantly, and therefore the United States should not remove 
its remaining trade restrictions affecting Korean shipments to 
the US market.
The KORUS FTA provisions on autos were a high priority 
for both countries. For Korean firms, the primary objective was 
to secure the immediate elimination of the small US tariff on 
passenger vehicles (2.5 percent). For the United States, the goal 
was to remove obstacles to market access in Korea, in particular 
the 8 percent Korean tariff, higher taxes on cars with larger 
engines, and regulations that favor incumbent producers.
The FTA outcome on autos makes both sides better off 
than they would be in the absence of the bilateral deal. The FTA 
removes tariffs immediately for most classes of cars and phases 
out over a decade the 25 percent US light truck tariff (a vestige 
of the 1963 “Chicken War” retaliation against Europe!).9
The light truck tariff is a major aberration in the US indus-
trial tariff schedule whose original justification has long since 
expired. Light trucks receive import protection higher than 
most other US products, including most textiles and apparel. 
This segment of the market generated substantial profits in past 
years for the Big 3, but Big 3 sales have slumped sharply in 
2007. Concern about cutting the US light truck tariff reflects 
in part the Big 3’s increased sensitivity to import competition 
in the face of this market weakness. Note, however, that the 
FTA tariff cuts would be phased in over nine years, meaning 
that in 2014 the US industry would still be protected by a 
double digit tariff.
Besides the tariff cuts, the FTA substantially reduces the 
burdens related to tax and regulatory policies. FTA provisions 
provide greater transparency and access to the regulatory process 
and a dispute resolution procedure to encourage compliance 
(with recourse to a snapback of the 2.5 percent US car tariff 
9. Currently, Korea does not export light trucks to the United States but 
hopes to begin competing against Japanese producers once the tariff cuts are 
implemented.
US employment data, coupled with 
stagnant real wages for the past 
decade, explain to some extent 
why US autoworkers have become 
increasingly restive toward new 
free trade initiatives in general 
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if rights are violated).10 The pact also establishes an “Autos 
Working Group” that will monitor and provide comments on 
new draft regulations in Korea.11 FTA investment provisions 
also  provide  general  protections  for  US  investors  in  Korea, 
who should face fewer problems in establishing joint ventures 
or other investments in the Korean auto sector than General 
Motors  endured  when  it  purchased  a  controlling  share  of 
Daewoo Motors in 2002. The pact goes beyond the World Trade 
Organization agreement on trade-related investment measures 
to bar performance requirements that require the transfer of 
technology (which could be of increasing importance given the 
industry focus on new hybrid fuels and engine technologies).
Will the FTA allow US auto exporters to compete more 
effectively in the Korean market? Chrysler and Ford express 
skepticism,  given  past  experience,  that  FTA  provisions  that 
promise greater transparency and access to regulatory agencies 
will remove the discriminatory treatment evidenced in the past 
administration of Korea’s regulatory policies affecting the auto 
sector. They argue that Korean tariff and nontariff barriers have 
restricted the supply of imported large vehicles—which tradi-
tionally have higher profit margins—to reserve a large share of 
that segment of the market for domestic producers.12 Whether 
due to aggressive pricing or to nontariff trade barriers or other 
factors,  a  surprisingly  high  percentage  of  Korean  produc-
10. The light truck tariff was not included in this snapback clause. Korean 
officials argued that investors might defer placements in Korean firms if the 
tariff cuts could be reversed.
11. For a summary of these provisions, see United States Trade Representative 
(USTR), “Fact Sheet on Auto-related provisions in the US-Korea Free Trade 
Agreement,” April 3, 2007. Available at the USTR’s website, www.ustr.gov.
12. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with using tax policy to promote so-
cially desirable objectives such as pollution control and public safety, provided 
the measures are applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
tion of larger cars is sold in the domestic market rather than 
exported, and these are the cars that compete most directly 
with imports. According to 2005 data reported by the Korea 
National Statistical Office (see table 2), Korean production of 
medium and large passenger cars, comparable in engine size to 
most imports, is only a quarter of total national production of 
passenger cars, but more than 40 percent of that production 
is sold in Korea (compared with less than 20 percent of light 
and small cars or 25 percent of multiutility vehicles). I suspect 
that such data explain only a small part of the story, and that 
lingering protectionism, relatively high tariffs and sales taxes, 
and high distribution and marketing costs, have all contributed 
to Korea’s low import penetration in autos.
Why did Korea give such priority to eliminating the small 
US tariff, and why have these provisions provoked such criti-
cism among labor unions in both countries? The answer to the 
first question seems to relate primarily to Japanese competition 
in the US market. Korean exporters have had to price aggres-
sively in the US market to compete with Japanese-made cars 
to compensate for currency movements. As shown in figure 1, 
the won/dollar rate has appreciated markedly over the past few 
years while the yen has weakened against the dollar. Korean 
profit margins have been squeezed, with Hyundai reporting 
2006 global profits down 35 percent due in large measure to 
the impact of the strong won (see “Won’s Rise Makes Waves,” 
Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2007). In these circumstances, 
while the swing in the won/dollar and yen/dollar rates swamps 
the impact of tariff reforms, the immediate 2.5 percent tariff 
reduction does provide a small cushion for Korean exporters in 
a highly competitive market. Such price competition is good 
for US consumers but adds further to the challenges facing 
the Big 3 American producers in their home market. More to 
Table 2    Breakdown on quantities of Korean auto production and shipment,
                    2005







Passenger car (light) 159,943  46,58   110,19 
Passenger car (small) 1,159,51  10,00   950,79 
Passenger car (medium) 591,964  5,07   366,095 
Passenger car (large) 8,398  139,7   148,560 
Passenger car (multiutility vehicle) 1,161,911  91,96   880,416 
Total 3,355,78  91,368       
 
,455,99 
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the point, the price competition will continue to sharpen, with 
or without the FTA, as companies try to increase or at least 
maintain market share. The US tariff concessions to Korea will 
not change the competitive conditions in the US market to any 
appreciable extent.
Are the auto provisions of the KORUS FTA “unbalanced?” 
In terms of the requirements to change existing policies, the 
answer is definitely yes. Korea is required to lower its barriers to 
trade and investment much more than the United States. 
Claims that the pact is “unbalanced” because the balance 
of trade is one-sided reflect confused economics and confuse 
the policy debate. The real issue is whether tariff liberalization 
and regulatory reform in Korea will create new export oppor-
tunities  for  US  automakers.  The  8  percent  tariff  advantage 
alone should help. US exporters will have a significant tariff 
preference in competition with Japanese and German cars for 
Korean customers, at least until the EU-Korea FTA and the 
Doha Round results are concluded and fully implemented.13 
The scope and pace of those reforms do not provide ironclad 
guarantees of increased US sales to Korea but the cost advan-
tage alone should generate sharply higher demand for US-made 
13. The European Union opened FTA negotiations with Korea in May 2007. 
EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson is seeking a deal comparable to the 
KORUS FTA; talks are projected to be completed by early 2008.
autos. Indeed, anecdotal reports about changes already taking 
place in the Korean market in anticipation of the FTA—includ-
ing price discounting by imported car dealers—suggest the pact 
could promote a narrowing of the price differentials between 
domestic and foreign cars, at least for models of similar size and 
engine displacement.
In sum, protectionist pressures in the United States arise 
due to competition both between US and foreign firms and 
between US unionized and nonunionized plants. US union 
opposition  is  in  large  measure  a  reaction  to  the  long-term 
decline  in  employment  and  stagnant  real  wages,  as  well  as 
new competition in the US market from foreign “transplants,” 
including most recently Korean automakers such as Hyundai 
and Kia. General Motors is doing very well in the Korean 
market, and US-based exporters can expect a sharp increase 
in sales to Korea from their current anemic levels—but the 
US industry won’t strengthen very much based on this export 
growth.
In terms of what should be done to restore the health of the 
US auto industry, FTAs have positive, albeit limited, medicinal 
powers. Curing the US industry’s chronic problems, particularly 
those related to healthcare and pension costs, require domestic 
policy reforms that should be urgently addressed by the US 
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US auto industry would not come from increased access to the 
Korean market, but from homegrown reforms introduced in 
response to competitive challenges in the US market.
Agriculture
Agriculture accounts for only 3 percent of bilateral trade but 
is a crucial component of each country’s trade politics. Indeed, 
political consideration of a prospective negotiation was repeat-
edly postponed because of concern that agriculture writ large 
would not be covered by the pact. So it is noteworthy that 
the pact covers almost all agricultural trade between the two 
countries, even if the liberalization schedule is protracted and 
in some cases incomplete for some sensitive products. It also is 
noteworthy that the United States agreed to exempt rice from 
Korea’s commitments. In some areas, the FTA will generate 
new competition for Korean farmers; in some areas, the new 
competition will be with farmers from other countries that 
export to Korea under existing FTAs (e.g., Chile and, in the 
near future, the European Union and Australia).
In the agricultural negotiations, the most important issue 
for Korea was rice and the most important issue for the United 
States was—and still is—beef. The exemption of rice was an 
important political gesture but did not change the economics 
of the FTA very much. As a practical matter, full liberalization 
of rice trade was never in the cards—the most that could have 
been achieved in the negotiations would have been a minor 
increase in the tariff rate quota that would have accommodated 
incremental US sales in the Korean market. Thus, the political 
benefit of excluding rice far outweighed the trade effect.
On beef, the FTA phases out Korean tariffs over 15 years. 
However, the FTA does not cover the main barrier to the Kore-
an market—the ban on US imports imposed for health reasons 
since December 2003 in response to the discovery of a bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)–infected cow (and partially 
lifted this year).14 With the determination issued in May 2007 
by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) that the 
United States is a “controlled risk” country, there is now an 
expectation that Korean regulators will be able to renew certi-
fication of US beef products. Indeed, Korean Deputy Prime 
14. Before the BSE-related ban in late 2003, US beef exports to Korea (HS 
chapter 2) were valued at $915 million and represented one-third of total US 
farm exports to Korea in 2003.
Minister Kwon Okyu commented after the OIE ruling that 
regulatory  proceedings  in  Korea  could  lead  to  the  removal 
of the import ban within a few months.15 As Senate Finance 
Committee  Chairman  Max  Baucus  (D-MT)  has  repeatedly 
warned, the US Congress is unlikely to consider ratification of 
the pact until the Korean beef ban is fully resolved.
FTA  tariff  reforms  should  provide  immediate  benefits 
for a broad range of US farm exports, including wheat and 
corn, soybeans for crushing, wine and bourbon whiskey, frozen 
concentrated orange juice, frozen french fries, and most fresh 
vegetables and tree nuts (the main exceptions are carrots, broc-
coli, cauliflower, and peas with a 5-year tariff phaseout and 
shelled walnuts with a 6-year tariff phaseout). For products 
such as fish, butter, cheese, food whey, barley, and corn starch, 
Korean  imports  will  continue  to  be  regulated  by  tariff-rate 
quotas for a period of 10 to 15 years. In the interim, however, 
the quotas will be expanded and the overquota tariff surcharge 
reduced until the protection is eliminated. Combined, these 
products account for a substantial share of US farm exports to 
Korea (see table 3).
A number of important products will be subject to partial 
liberalization. Seasonal restrictions on navel oranges will remain 
(except  for  small  annual  quota  increases)  but  out-of-season 
tariffs will be phased out over seven years—given the different 
growing seasons, US exporters of oranges should benefit signif-
icantly from this new access during Korea’s off season. The high 
tariffs on mandarin oranges and Fuji apples will be eliminated 
over 15 and 20 years, respectively. Overall, the FTA should spur 
significant growth in US agricultural exports to Korea: Again, 
the largest gain could well accrue from regulatory actions on 
beef not directly covered by the FTA obligations.
In sum, the FTA liberalization of farm trade predominantly 
benefits US agricultural exporters.16 Korean officials acknowl-
edged that the pact will adversely affect some segments of its 
agrarian economy—particularly beef, pork, mandarin oranges, 
and  beans—and  proffered  new  adjustment  assistance  and 
compensation programs to mitigate the adjustment burdens 
for those Korean farmers.17
15. However, concerns by Korean regulators about the reliability of US 
monitoring of beef exports have resurfaced due to the recent spate of mistakes 
in which certain boned beef still proscribed by Korean health authorities was 
included in US shipments to Korea. These US production/shipping errors 
could delay and possibly hamper the resolution of the beef problem.
16. However, given the large Korean-American community, Korean officials 
also predict an increase in specialty food exports to serve the ethnic market in 
the United States.
17.  See, for example, “Domestic Compensation Measures in light of the 
Conclusion of KORUS FTA,” statement by Korean Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Finance and Economy Kwon Okyu on behalf of other Korean 
ministers issued after the conclusion of the FTA talks on April 2, 2007. Avail-
able at the Ministry of Finance and Economy’s website, www.english.mofe.
go.kr (accessed on August 7, 2007).
The FTA outcome on autos makes both 
sides better off than they would be 





HTS 4  
 digit
 code
   HTS 10 
                digit 
    code
Description 2005     2006
02 Meat and edible offal meat 193,704 273,894
001 Meat of bovine animals, fresh or chilled 0 88
00 Meat of bovine animals, frozen  0 160
003 Meat of swine (pork), fresh, chilled, or frozen 133,549 03,613
003194000 Meat of swine, nesoi, except processed, fresh, or chilled 5,43 34,741
00319000 Meat of swine, nesoi, processed, fresh, or chilled 4 1,468
0039000 Meat of swine, nesoi, processed or frozen ,101 6,053
00394000 Meat of swine, nesoi, except processed or frozen 88,87 141,309
007 Meat and edible offal of poultry (chickens, ducks, geese, 
      turkeys, and guineas), fresh, chilled, or frozen
4,61 51,899
03 Fish and crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates 390,537 404,912
0301 Fish, live 1,599 1,461
030 Fish, fresh or chilled, excluding fish fillets and other fish
    meat without bones; fish livers and roes, chilled
,666 5,736
0303 Fish, frozen, excluding fish fillets and other fish meat
    without bones; fish livers and roes, frozen
17,819 30,571
0303804050 Alaska pollock (Theragra Chalcogramma) roe, frozen 145,44 14,940
0304 Fish fillets and other fish meat (minced or not), fresh, 
     chilled, or frozen
149,77 143,188
04 Dairy produce; birds’ eggs; natural honey; and edible products
of animal origin, nesoi
47,366 51,856
0401 Milk and cream, not concentrated nor containing added sweetening 5 16
040 Milk and cream, concentrated or containing added sweetening 1,189 1,618
0403 Buttermilk, curded milk and cream, yogurt, kephir, etc.,   
       flavored or not, etc., or containing added fruit or cocoa
,4 1,515
0404 Whey and other products consisting of natural milk constituents
       nesoi, concentrated or sweetened or not
17,654 ,445
0405 Butter and other fats and oils derived from milk 36 38
0406 Cheese and curd ,477 ,400
07 edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers 15,782 19,432
0701 Potatoes (other than sweet potatoes), fresh or chilled 605 1,485
0709 Vegetables nesoi, fresh or chilled 8,699 7,95
0710 Vegetables (uncooked or cooked by steam or boiling water), frozen ,118 ,696
08 edible fruit and nuts: Peel of citrus fruits or melons 187,080 210,923
080 Nuts nesoi, fresh or dried 5,73 67,865
0805 Citrus fruit, fresh or dried 113,77 111,903
080510000 Oranges, Temple, fresh or dried 15,049 4,6
0805100040 Oranges, nesoi, fresh or dried 8,99 35,640
0806 Grapes, fresh or dried 7,391 8,44
Table 3     US exports to Korea in selected agricultural products (thousands of dollars)
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services
Increased  trade  and  investment  in  services,  coupled  with 
regulatory reform of Korean service industries, were a priority 
objective of both countries. For the United States, FTA provi-
sions  on  trade  and  investment  in  financial  services,  express 
delivery, and professional services (such as legal and accounting 
services), create significant new business opportunities. Insur-
ance companies, in particular, will benefit from broad ranging 
rights of establishment as well as increased cross-border trade in 
a wide range of insurance products. The FTA also bars customs 
duties on electronic commerce and lifts investment restrictions 
in Korean telecommunications companies. In addition, Korea 
further liberalized or locked in changes in broadcasting and 
cable quotas undertaken just before the formal negotiations 
began.
All these Korean “concessions” are good news for the Kore-
an economy and for Korean companies and workers. Indeed, 
the services provisions of the KORUS FTA could well be the 
most important aspect of the deal for Korea. By committing 
to greater transparency of administrative and regulatory proce-
dures and by removing obstacles to investment and the provi-
sion of services (where restrictions often raise production and 
distribution costs for producers of goods and services alike), 
the Korean government will help promote a more conducive 








             digit 
 code
Description 2005     2006
10 Cereals 429,075 944,504
1001 Wheat and meslin 181,13 188,76
1005 Corn (maize) 39,378 73,334
12 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits: Miscellaneous grains, seeds, and 
fruits; industrial or medicinal plants; and straw and fodder
322,586 267,181
101 Soybeans, broken or not 199,406 113,068
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts, or other parts of plants 99,473 101,023
009 Fruit juices not fortified with vitamins or minerals (including  
grape must) and vegetable juices, unfermented and not containing 
added spirits, containing added sweetening or not
30,514 31,554
00911000 Orange juice, unfermented, frozen, in containers 
      each holding less than 0.946 liter
1,896 ,463
009110040 Orange juice, unfermented, frozen, in containers each holding 
      0.946 liter or more but not more than 3.785 liters
4 613
009110060 Orange juice, unfermented, frozen, in 
     containers of more than 3.785 liters
8,31 5,331
009904000 Mixtures of fruit juices, unfermented 5,597 8,100
22 Beverages, spirits, and vinegar 36,229 36,241
0 Waters, including mineral waters and aerated waters,
      containing added sweetening or flavored,  
      and other nonalcoholic beverages nesoi
15,10 13,547
04 Wine of fresh grapes, including fortified wines; grape must have 
      an alcoholic strength by volume   
      exceeding 0.5 percent volume, nesoi
10,018 11,138
total agriculture exportsa 2,107,676 2,795,231
nesoi =  not elsewhere specified or included.
a. Agriculture is defined as HS 1-4 in HS  digit code. 
Source: USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade Dataweb (accessed on May 30, 007).
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sources. The ancillary benefits of the required investment and 
regulatory  reforms,  as  well  as  the  increased  productivity  of 
service industries, should accrue across the Korean economy. 
In this regard, the KORUS FTA can help address one of the 
key challenges facing the Korean economy recently highlighted 
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD 2007): the gap between Korea and the best 
performing countries due to Korea’s low level of productivity 
growth.
The FTA is deficient, however, in its lack of obligations 
regarding the movement of natural persons. This shortcom-
ing is the fault of the US negotiators whose hands were tied 
by a congressional mandate that “immigration” issues broadly 
defined could not be discussed in the context of a trade pact. 
As a result, the FTA does not expand the H-1B visas for Korean 
nationals, despite the inherent need of many US firms for qual-
ified workers. However, the United States and Korea have been 
discussing, in parallel with the KORUS FTA, the inclusion of 
Korea in the US visa waiver program, with the expectation that 
the administration will qualify Korea for this preferential treat-
ment in the very near future.
Kaesong industrial Complex
Each country started the negotiations in a position diametri-
cally opposed to the other: Korea wanted goods produced in 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea to be fully 
eligible for FTA preferences; and the United States wanted no 
benefits from the FTA to accrue to the regime of Kim Jong-Il. 
Nonetheless, the two partners shared a common objective of 
promoting cooperation on security issues in Northeast Asia 
and encouraging the process of policy reform in North Korea.
A year ago, I suggested to both governments that they 
establish “procedures in the FTA itself for updating the pact 
if and when the reunification process advances” (Schott, Brad-
ford, and Moll 2006, 15).18 In the course of the talks, the two 
sides bridged their differences in Annex 22-C on “outward 
processing zones” (OPZs) on the Korean peninsula. The agree-
ment does not accord trade preferences to goods produced in 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex, but it does create a process 
for future consideration of such a development, if the econom-
ic and political situation on the Korean peninsula changes as 
desired by both FTA partners.
To that end, the FTA establishes a committee to (1) identify 
geographic areas that may be designated OPZs; and (2) develop 
criteria for evaluating whether goods produced in OPZs may 
be considered eligible for FTA preferences. The criteria must 
include environmental and labor standards and practices and 
18. Graham (2007) made a similar recommendation in his analysis of histori-
cal precedents for including special export zones in trade agreements.
take account of how the standards and practices compare with 
(1) those in the local economy, and (2) relevant international 
norms [emphasis added]. Committee decisions regarding OPZ 
designations and FTA eligibility are not self-executing. Exten-
sion of FTA preferences to new areas (OPZs) would require 
amendments to the agreement. For the United States, such 
an amendment would have to be ratified by the Congress and 
implemented through new legislation. The Chairman of the 
House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee, Sander Levin 
(D-MI),  argued  in  early  June  that  these  procedures  would 
not be consistent with the obligations on labor standards that 
the  United  States Trade  Representative  (USTR)  committed 
to include in every FTA. However, the FTA preferences can 
only be applied to OPZs if the KORUS FTA is amended, 
and Congress is unlikely to approve such changes if the labor 
conditions do not comport with international norms. I suspect 
that Congressman Levin’s concern will be addressed through 
clarifying language in FTA implementing legislation.
iMPliCAtiOns FOR tRADe RelAtiOns 
in the AsiA-PACiFiC RegiOn
The conclusion of the FTA also has profound implications for 
the trade relations that Korea and the United States have with 
other countries. As noted earlier, the European Union already 
has sought to emulate the KORUS FTA with its own bilat-
eral pact. The KORUS FTA accelerated the preparations and 
launch in May 2007 of new free trade negotiations between 
the European Union and Korea. European exports to East Asia 
have revived in the past two years, but risk being sideswiped 
by the new preferences accorded by bilateral and regional trade 
deals to which Europe is not a party, just like the concerns 
that are addressed in the United States. European officials have 
emulated US initiatives in Asia, and recently launched talks 
with not only Korea, but also with ASEAN and India. Like 
US-Korea trade, autos are a main component of EU-Korea 
Trade is not a top priority for the 
Democratic leadership in Congress; 
however several trade initiatives 
and trade preference programs 
require legislative action—including 
renewal of the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) program.N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 7                                                                                                                                                                                           Au Gu S T   2 0 0 7
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trade. EU officials covet the new access promised US exporters 
in the KORUS FTA; indeed, if US ratification of that pact 
is delayed, EU exporters could gain preferential access to the 
Korean market over their US and Japanese competitors.
Under these circumstances, Japan could be prompted to 
follow suit—even though the outcome of the July 2007 Upper 
House election seems to presage a go-slow approach to Japa-
nese  agricultural  reform  that  such  agreements  would  likely 
require. Nonetheless, if and when the EU and US FTAs with 
Korea enter into force, Japanese officials will be hard pressed 
not to revive the long-stalled free trade talks between Korea 
and Japan, and also will have to seriously consider FTA talks 
with the United States and/or the European Union. 
As with Korea, the idea of an FTA with the United States 
has been vetted for a long time in Japan but was shelved due 
to domestic resistance to agricultural and regulatory reforms. 
The topic was discussed in bilateral talks between President 
Bush and Prime Minister Abe in late April, but preparations 
for FTA talks were deferred due to internal resistance from 
the Ministry of Agriculture and well-founded concerns about 
the upcoming Upper House elections. Like Korea, Japan has a 
broad economic and foreign policy agenda that could be served 
by a closer partnership with the United States, especially at a 
time when the global trade talks face an uncertain outcome and 
when competition from China is moving up the value-added 
chain. That said, without a renewal of US trade promotion 
authority (TPA), we may not see any new FTA negotiations 
involving the United States in the near term.
Could the KORUS FTA be a building block toward a 
broader Asia-Pacific trade accord? The answer is possibly but 
not quickly. The Asia-Pacific region is home to a variety of 
trade agreements which differ widely in terms of quality and 
participation. Various proposals are now being vetted in an 
effort to harmonize existing arrangements; some would also 
extend  membership  to  other  Asia-Pacific  partners.  All  the 
models that have been suggested—whether it is ASEAN-10 
plus  1,  ASEAN-10  plus  3,  ASEAN-10  plus  6,  or  the  Free 
Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP)—have at their core the 
ASEAN, and ASEAN is not well integrated itself. Moreover, 
the basic underlying economic conditions are so different in so 
many countries that developing a consensus will be laborious. 
Regional integration thus will be an evolutionary process with 
competing models of engagement.
PROsPeCts FOR COngRessiOnAl RAtiFiCAtiOn 
OF the KORUs FtA
The conclusion of the KORUS FTA negotiations in early April 
2007 took place while another set of high stakes trade negotia-
tions—those between leaders in the US Congress and the Bush 
administration—were  still  being  contested.  At  issue  in  the 
domestic talks was nothing less than “A New Trade Policy for 
America” and the start of a process to restore bipartisan support 
in the Congress for US trade initiatives after a decade of frac-
tious partisanship by the Republican majority that controlled 
both the House of Representatives and the Senate until January 
2007.
The  Congress-administration  negotiation  progressed  in 
fits and starts. A deal was finally struck on May 10, 2007, 
covering labor, environment, intellectual property, government 
procurement, national security issues relating to port manage-
ment and services, investment, and support and training for 
domestic workers (see Destler 2007). In essence, it is a domes-
tic political deal in which congressional Democrats (led by 
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Charles Rangel 
[D-NY] and endorsed by Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi 
[D-CA]) and the Bush administration (represented by USTR 
Susan Schwab and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson) recon-
firm that all FTAs signed by June 30, 2007 (meaning Peru, 
Panama, Colombia, and Korea) qualify for the “fast track,” 
implementing procedures afforded by the TPA of the Trade 
Act of 2002, and commit to support ratification of trade agree-
ments that reflect the agreed changes in US trade negotiating 
objectives. For Korea (and Colombia), however, the calculus 
is a little more complicated, since the House Ways and Means 
Committee called for additional changes in those countries’ 
policies beyond the areas delineated in the pact.19 Underscor-
ing that point, Speaker Pelosi, House Majority Leader Steny 
Hoyer (D-MD), Ways and Means Chairman Rangel, and Trade 
Subcommittee Chairman Levin reiterated on June 29, 2007, 
19. While not a part of the agreement, the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee issued a cover note to their announcement of the pact that listed additional 
concerns regarding Korean trade and regulatory barriers, particularly in the 
auto sector, which “will have to be addressed.”
The Bush administration needs to 
respond constructively to Democratic 
concerns about the FTA and the 
competitiveness of the US auto 
industry. In return Speaker Pelosi 
should encourage Chairman Rangel to 
negotiate a legislative compromise.N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 7                                                                                                                                                                                           Au Gu S T   2 0 0 7
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that “we cannot support the KFTA as currently negotiated.”20
The KORUS FTA was signed on June 30, 2007, after the 
issues covered in the bipartisan agreement were incorporated 
into the FTA text. The US International Trade Commission 
(USITC) is now conducting the required analysis of the pact; 
once the USITC report is submitted, the formal legislative 
process can begin. However, public debate over the FTA has 
been underway in both countries for quite some time, and crit-
ics have been quick to voice concerns. Congress is now hearing 
the “squeaky wheels,” especially from Detroit. Some feel disad-
vantaged by the KORUS FTA; others seem to be opposing the 
trade deal in order to leverage changes in domestic policies 
of beneficial interest to their industry. Such critiques are not 
uncommon at this stage of the legislative process before propo-
nents begin to lobby specific legislation. But the situation is 
more complex and uncertain than in the past due to the change 
in congressional leadership and to the bipartisan pact between 
the Congress and the Bush administration.
As  with  other  FTAs—including  NAFTA—debated  by 
the Congress, the economic case for the KORUS FTA will be 
convincing but not necessarily politically compelling. Increased 
trade and investment generated by a bilateral pact, even with a 
major trading partner, is not that important for the $13 trillion 
US economy. Most major US trade initiatives have been sold 
to the Congress on foreign policy grounds; indeed, NAFTA 
seemed  headed  for  defeat  until  then  General  Colin  Powell 
convincingly argued that the trade deal would contribute to 
greater  political  and  economic  stability  throughout  Central 
America and thus greater security at the long US border with 
Mexico. After that testimony, the NAFTA passed the House by 
a vote of 234 to 200.
I expect a similar dynamic to drive the ratification debate 
on the KORUS FTA. The economic benefits of the pact will be 
weighed against the adjustment costs. Proponents also will argue 
that the deal is needed to counter the discrimination that US 
exporters and investors face due to trade agreements between 
Korea and other countries and to ensure that the growing wave 
of bilateral and regional arrangements among East Asian coun-
tries continues to include the United States. The prospective 
conclusion of the EU-Korea FTA in early 2008 will reinforce 
this argument: If Congress defers action on the KORUS FTA, 
the US auto industry (among others) will suffer as its European 
competitors get preferences in the Korean market. Ultimately, 
however, the Congress will likely support the KORUS FTA 
because of its strategic importance—in particular the durabil-
ity of the US-Korea alliance over the past half century and our 
20. The statement specifically noted problems with the pact’s auto provisions. 
See, Speaker Nancy Pelosi, press release, June 29, 2007. Available at the 
Speaker of the House’s website, www.speaker.gov (accessed July 16, 2007).
mutual interest in reinforcing it, our common objectives in 
promoting peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula, and 
the breadth of the US commitment to the East Asian region.
When will the Congress vote on implementing legislation 
for the KORUS FTA? There is no clear timetable. Under TPA, a 
vote could occur soon after submission of the requisite econom-
ic impact analysis by the USITC in late September 2007 or be 
deferred for a substantial period of time; the “fast track” proce-
dures only require an expeditious vote without amendment 
once implementing legislation is tabled. Given the economic 
and political reasons cited above, Congress should expedite 
ratification, so the pact can enter into force by January 2009.
That said, the current session of Congress (through the 
2008  presidential  election)  has  an  unusually  large  number 
of prospective trade votes on its legislative calendar. Trade is 
not a top priority for the Democratic leadership in Congress; 
however several trade initiatives and trade preference programs 
require  legislative  action—including  renewal  of  the  Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. The FTAs with Peru, 
Panama, Colombia, and Korea will compete with those trade 
issues and other legislation—including a new farm bill—for 
congressional attention.21 Extending TPA in its current form 
is highly unlikely in this Congress, though a short-term exten-
sion of TPA solely for the Doha Round is possible if those talks 
make substantial progress later this year.
Speaker Pelosi’s June 29, 2007 statement—which specifi-
cally targeted the pact’s auto provisions—presents a significant 
obstacle to congressional ratification of the KORUS FTA. The 
Bush administration needs a substantial minority of Democratic 
members to support implementing legislation for the KORUS 
FTA and risks losing those votes if it ignores the Speaker’s posi-
tion. However, acceding to the Speaker’s demands also risks 
failure; Korea would certainly demand changes in other FTA 
21.  My best guess is that the Peru and Panama FTAs will be approved in 
early fall 2007 based on changes made to the pacts pursuant to the terms set 
by the Congress-administration arrangement. A vote on Colombia will likely 
be postponed until new programs by the Uribe government make progress in 
dealing with the paramilitary scandals. 
The stakes—in terms of both US 
economic and security interests 
in East Asia—are too great, 
and the costs too high, to reject 
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provisions benefiting US interests and the entire deal could 
quickly unravel.22
How  can  this  dilemma  be  overcome?  Changing  the 
substantive provisions of the FTA’s auto chapter won’t work 
and isn’t justified in any event. As noted earlier, the Democratic 
critique of these provisions is not convincing. But the Bush 
administration needs to respond constructively to Democratic 
concerns about the FTA and the competitiveness of the US 
auto industry. For example, federal programs could assist the 
companies  in  complying  with  new  fuel  economy  standards 
and financing their “legacy” pension and healthcare costs. In 
return Speaker Pelosi should encourage Chairman Rangel to 
negotiate a legislative compromise. Such a deal should focus on 
domestic measures that would help US automakers compete at 
home and abroad but also—for political reasons—may have 
to augment the FTA’s auto safeguard provision (which seeks to 
ensure that commitments to reduce nontariff barriers to auto 
trade will be faithfully enforced). If Chairman Rangel can pull 
the two sides together, as he did with great skill and patience 
to produce the May 10, 2007 accord, then ratification of the 
KORUS FTA could proceed in late 2007 or early 2008 (with a 
vote possibly delayed until after the Michigan primary election 
in February 2008).23 
22. Korean officials were upset that they had to reopen the FTA text just days 
before the signing deadline to accommodate additional provisions required by 
the May 10, 2007, Congress-administration deal.
23. Again this timetable assumes the resolution of the beef issue; if problems 
persist, ratification will be postponed.
The ratification debate in Congress will be contentious. In 
the end, however, I am confident that the KORUS FTA will 
be approved. The stakes—in terms of both US economic and 
security interests in East Asia—are too great, and the costs too 
high, to reject the pact or defer a decision.
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